Wherein We Study A Buffer Overflow And Ready Our Aim: testing the waters

 

Initial disclaimer: please check the link below, as it will be necessary when following along the pdf.

Hi, again! Ready for some more low-level code goodness?
Today we'll take a look at some very simple, yet purposefully flawed C programs in order to learn a bit more about buffer overflows, grasping control of the return address and disrupting a program's flow.

In the first example, we'll see that the program will result in a segmentation fault, and understand why that's happening exactly, by looking at the disassembled code under the GDB debugger. We'll then talk a little about registers, the return address, its importance, and how to grab control of it.

In the second example, we'll take a look at the basics, which will let us finally take advantage of the return address through a buffer overflow.
But, without much ado, let's jump to our first example. Remember that these two first programs are directly taken from Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit, which you can find here (revised edition! - please follow this link to disable defenses. Alternatively check this. If you don't do this, you won't be able to take advantage of these methods).

This program is creating a char array named large_string which can take up to 256 characters, and then it's filling large_string with A's. After that's done, the program is calling a function named function, using large_string as the argument. The problem becomes immediately obvious since, as we can see, inside that function, we're filling a char array entitled buffer with our A's. But our buffer can only take in 16 characters. Ergo, we have our buffer overflow.

Function was created and its local variable buffer can only hold so many of our A's. But, since we're using strcpy, which has no control for how many values we can enter, we'll just keep on writing A's until we reach the null character (at the end of large_string).

But let's open our debugger and actually see what's happening here.

So, we're looking at main(). Can you see our loop? We're moving 'A' into eax and advancing the counter at ebp-12. A is the ASCII representation of number 41:

   0x000011ea <+50>: mov    BYTE PTR [eax],0x41

Adding +1 to our counter at ebp-0cx:

   0x000011ed <+53>: add    DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x1

And comparing that value with 254 (so as to know when to end the loop):

   0x000011f1 <+57>: cmp    DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0xfe

When this is finally done, as I'm sure you can see, we're jumping right into our function, and this is where the fun starts. Let's disassemble it:

Please take a moment to learn what's happening here, and compare it side by side with the C code. But let us move on and actually see what's happening with our memory, as we set a breakpoint in main:

With x/32x $esp, we're checking memory position 0xffffcfa0, to which ESP is pointing, and the addresses 32 bytes above that. I won't go into much detail. You'll see soon enough what will happen when we step forward and finally reach our function breakpoint:

Looking at the memory addresses, it's obvious what happened: these locations were filled with 0x41414141 or, in plain text, AAAA.

It's important to note that the A's are being written from higher memory positions to lower ones. This is crucial because one of the last things overwritten is the return address, which will cause our segmentation fault.

As we move along, at a certain point, the return address will also be filled with A's, and at that moment we won't have a valid return address any longer. As a result, our program will suffer a segmentation fault.

And that's it. We're going nowhere fast. This program has just died on our hands. If we were trying to crack this program, we would have wanted, instead, to take control of the return address stored next to EBP. We'd use that value and point towards some other function we wanted, for example, thus altering the program's flow in our favor.

Yes, we're slowly creeping towards true shellcode. We'll get there eventually, don't worry.

But before we do that, we might as well talk about other interesting tidbits that can prove helpful when using a debugger and watching our shellcode or buffer overflow in action.

I've already shown quite a few pics, so I won't give you another one, but here's the very first function that appears in our "Smashing the Stack" doc. It's pretty simple, but it hopefully shines a light on the function we've been analyzing so far:

void function(int a, int b, int c) {

char buffer1[5];

char buffer2[10];

}

void main() {

function(1,2,3);

}

If we look at the memory locations, as we did before with the other program, we'll see:

0xffffd09c: 0x00000000 0xf7ffcff4         0x0000002c 0x00000000

0xffffd0ac: 0xffffdfc0         0xf7fc7550 0x00000000 0xf7da2a4f

0xffffd0bc: 0xffffd0e8 0x565561e5 0x00000001 0x00000002

0xffffd0cc: 0x00000003 0xffffd110         0xf7fc1688 0xf7fc1b60

0xffffd0dc: 0x00000000 0xffffd100 0xf7fa2ff4 0x00000000

0xffffd0ec: 0xf7da92d5 0x00000000 0x00000070 0xf7ffcff4

0xffffd0fc:         0xf7da92d5 0x00000001 0xffffd1b4 0xffffd1bc

0xffffd10c: 0xffffd120 0xf7fa2ff4 0x565561b6 0x00000001

I have put in bold important addresses and their contents. In order, from left to right, going down...

ESP

• Points to the current top of the stack.
• At 0xffffd09c (the lowest memory address in this snapshot)
• ESP is showing the exact spot in memory where new data are pushed onto the stack

Saved EBP

• At 0xffffd0bc
• The base pointer of the caller function
• This marks the base of the previous stack frame before the current function was called

Return Address

• At 0xffffd0c0
• This is the address the program will jump back to after the current function completes
• overwriting this location with a malicious address can cause the program to "return" to an arbitrary memory location

Variables

• Just below the saved EBP and return address are the local variables and parameters
• At 0xffffd0c4 (0x00000001), 0xffffd0c8 (0x00000002) and 0xffffd0cc (0x00000003)

Buffer

• Just below these local variables we can see the space that has been assigned to our buffer1 and buffer2 local variables
• It's not 5+10 bytes in size. Instead, because of padding and alignment, it will be 8+12 bytes in size, for a total of 20 bytes.

---

Next up: We'll learn how to control the return address and force the program to do our bidding. This will set the stage for mastering the art of shellcoding! 

Wherein We Wade Through A Shellcode Shore: before the dive

 

Open Spotify > Search: 'Call it Fate, Call it Karma', by The Strokes > Play > Thank me later

Are you in the mood for some history and cool computer tales? Just lay back, enjoy the music, and hear me out.

While playing the Narnia game on OverTheWire, I hit a roadblock. I could either hack my way into advancing another level, or I could step back, take a better look at what was being presented, and learn a little bit more in the process. Ask a few questions, you know? Like why is it that...? You catch my drift.

This blogpost marks the beginning of that journey and some of what I learned while studying shellcode, its history, implications, and the tricks of the trade. Since the rabbit hole runs pretty deep, I'll be breaking this post in multiple parts. Don't worry, though—since real friends know C (and then break it) I'll be getting back to the C cracking series in no time. Fret not.

The Narnia game is about code injection and shellcode... But what is that?

It's essentially a small piece of code used as a payload in exploiting vulnerabilities.

It’s a means to an end: allowing attackers to exploit certain bugs, like buffer overflows, and thus alter the normal program logic (e.g., skipping a function altogether and steering the program's flow toward the attacker's purpose).

The name says it all: shellcode—spawning a shell and gaining control of the target machine to run commands at will. This was the original purpose (FYI: more modern shellcode can perform many different actions beyond just spawning a shell).

Shellcode was hugely popular in the late '90s and early 2000s when software was (even more) riddled with vulnerabilities that allowed direct code execution (see: the Morris Worm, 1988).

But shellcode is more than that. Over time, it evolved as hackers got more creative, bypassing security mechanisms, evading antivirus tools, etc. There were even competitions to cram the shortest shellcode possible into tiny bits of data. With the right perspective, anything can be fun.

Shellcode is tipically created in ASM - which allows for compact code (very important in limited memory spaces) and also gives much finer control over CPU instructions and memory manipulation.

Fun fact: Shellcode must be position-independent.

Being position-independent means that it can be executed correctly regardless of where in memory it ends up. This is crucial because we don't know where exactly it will be loaded during execution. Position-independent code (PIC) uses relative addresses, making it adaptable no matter where that code is injected.
Cool, right?

Remember that more modern systems (and even some older ones) use protections like ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization), which randomizes memory addresses. This often drives assembly students to fits of despair when they realize they can’t follow the same memory positions as they debug code unless they turn those protections off (I’ve heard that self-inflicted hair-pulling isn't uncommon).

You might think that with all these modern protections, shellcode would be mostly irrelevant by now. Not quite.

While many classic exploits have been mitigated by security features like ASLR, DEP/NX, stack canaries, shellcode is still widely used in modern attack vectors like buffer overflow attacks, exploits in poorly configured environments, malware, and Return Oriented Programming (ROP).

A blast from the past

I'm currently reading an oldie but goodie, 'Smashing The Stack For Fun An Profit", and thoroughly enjoying it. It's fun, and if this stuff interests you at all, you should definitely check it out.

No code or exercises on this blogpost—yet. I'm still new to this and want to have something a bit more organized before diving into these waters, but another blopost should follow soon.

If you have any advice on books, courses, or other resources on this subject, please hit me up on LinkedIn, Twitter, Mastodon, or right here. I’m always open to learning more.