Showing posts with label Memory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Memory. Show all posts

Sunday, December 22, 2024

Wherein We Look At An ELF: Executable and Linkable Format

 


                So, this is an ELF file, huh?


Elves

For the past few days, I've been delving into ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) binaries—specifically focusing on their structure, behavior, and ways to manipulate them. If the subject matter is of any interest to you, then check this out.

What are ELF files?

They are a "common standard file format for executable files, object code, shared libraries, and core dumps, at least according to Wikipedia.
The magic number for ELF files is 0x7f 45 4C 46. Care to guess what's 45 4C and 46 in ASCII?

Let's look at (yet another) terribly simple C script and then look under the covers:



Not terribly impressive, but we're not trying to be terrible or to impress anyone.

Remember when we talked a bit about the 4-step compilation process here? Instead of directly compiling this program, let's jump to the Assembly phase and look at the object file:


So, as we can see, we have a 64-bit ELF object file... relocatable. What does it mean for this to be relocatable?
It means that it's not dependent on specific memory addresses. So this file can be moved around without breaking its code. Our code isn't yet an executable. We're still short of that objective since we've not yet passed through the linking phase, which will or might add to it other object files or libraries, and then yes, produce our executable.

Remember that, for the most part, programmers skip and don't even think about these steps. The compilation process takes care of all of this in the background, and only if something is untoward will the programmer be warned that one of these 4 steps went awry.
And notice as well that this file is 'not stripped'. What's this, you ask? It's informing us that the the file contains the symbol table and debugging information within it. This keeps information that is useful for debugging purposes, making it easier to analyze and understand what's happening, with tools like gdb or objdump. On the other hand, stripping our binary means that both symbol table and debugging info will be removed. The symbol table contains the names of functions, files, variables and other metadata useful for debugging or reverse engineering. And that extra debugging info shows the variable types and line numbers, for example.
So, stripping will reduce the file size, hide implementation details but also make debugging a bit harder.

Under the hood

Let's do it. It's pretty simple, actually. After finally creating our binary, we can strip it with:
strip --strip-all simple_adder

Here we can see the difference between the two files, through the use of the command readelf:



It's a bit rough around the edges, but if you look carefully, you can see two files, one stripped and one not stripped, and the difference is telling, even for such a small binary.
Obviously, stripping is also used as a countermeasure and obfuscation technique.

The readelf command that you see up there is a tool for analyzing and displaying information about ELF files. With it, we can inspect the internal structure of ELF files, such as executables, shared libraries, or object files. Yes, it's what that ELF lady is doing at the beginning of this blog post. I know. Genius.

Readelf comes in handy to debug linking issues or to understand how an executable or a library is laid out.
As per usual, man files are your friend here.


.text, .data, .bss and .rodata

Elf files have critical areas, like .text which contains executable instructions, .data which stores initialized global variables, .bss which holds uninitialized global variables and .rodata, which holds read-only data, such as constant strings.

We can inspect the .text section, which could be considered as the heart of the program (holding the executable code, really), with a tool like radare2 or objdump, for example:




As you can see, this is giving us Assembly code (in AT&T, no less... yuck) revealing function prologues, loops, and system calls.
Of course, recognizing these patterns is a vital skill for the Reverse Engineer.

Try this for yourself. Also remember to check .data and .bss with:
readelf -x .data your_file
readelf -x .bss your_file

But there's more ways to inspect your ELF files. Let's look at ldd which prints shared object dependencies and use readelf with '-r' to check relocation tables:



What's all of this, you say?
With ldd we can check the shared libraries within our binary. Each listed library representing a dependency. And relocation tables are essential for adjusting addresses in a dynamically loaded binary. Entries like R_X86_64_JUMP_SLOT or R_X86_64_GLOB_DAT help resolve function calls or global variables at runtime.

There's more, of course. But this stuff is much more fun to experiment with than just to talk or write about.

Go at it. Experiment with creating your own binary files and examine them with any or all of these tools (or others). Change things, check again.


No elves were harmed in the making of this blogpost. Nor any DWARF, of course.










Sunday, October 20, 2024

Wherein We Study A Buffer Overflow And Ready Our Aim: testing the waters

 


Initial disclaimer: please check the link below, as it will be necessary when following along the pdf.


Hi, again! Ready for some more low-level code goodness?
Today we'll take a look at some very simple, yet purposefully flawed C programs in order to learn a bit more about buffer overflows, grasping control of the return address and disrupting a program's flow.

In the first example, we'll see that the program will result in a segmentation fault, and understand why that's happening exactly, by looking at the disassembled code under the GDB debugger. We'll then talk a little about registers, the return address, its importance, and how to grab control of it.

In the second example, we'll take a look at the basics, which will let us finally take advantage of the return address through a buffer overflow.
But, without much ado, let's jump to our first example. Remember that these two first programs are directly taken from Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit, which you can find here (revised edition! - please follow this link to disable defenses. Alternatively check this. If you don't do this, you won't be able to take advantage of these methods).


This program is creating a char array named large_string which can take up to 256 characters, and then it's filling large_string with A's. After that's done, the program is calling a function named function, using large_string as the argument. The problem becomes immediately obvious since, as we can see, inside that function, we're filling a char array entitled buffer with our A's. But our buffer can only take in 16 characters. Ergo, we have our buffer overflow.

Function was created and its local variable buffer can only hold so many of our A's. But, since we're using strcpy, which has no control for how many values we can enter, we'll just keep on writing A's until we reach the null character (at the end of large_string).

But let's open our debugger and actually see what's happening here.


So, we're looking at main(). Can you see our loop? We're moving 'A' into eax and advancing the counter at ebp-12. A is the ASCII representation of number 41:

   0x000011ea <+50>: mov    BYTE PTR [eax],0x41

Adding +1 to our counter at ebp-0cx:
   0x000011ed <+53>: add    DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x1

And comparing that value with 254 (so as to know when to end the loop):
   0x000011f1 <+57>: cmp    DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0xfe

When this is finally done, as I'm sure you can see, we're jumping right into our function, and this is where the fun starts. Let's disassemble it:




Please take a moment to learn what's happening here, and compare it side by side with the C code. But let us move on and actually see what's happening with our memory, as we set a breakpoint in main:



With x/32x $esp, we're checking memory position 0xffffcfa0, to which ESP is pointing, and the addresses 32 bytes above that. I won't go into much detail. You'll see soon enough what will happen when we step forward and finally reach our function breakpoint:



Looking at the memory addresses, it's obvious what happened: these locations were filled with 0x41414141 or, in plain text, AAAA.

It's important to note that the A's are being written from higher memory positions to lower ones. This is crucial because one of the last things overwritten is the return address, which will cause our segmentation fault.

As we move along, at a certain point, the return address will also be filled with A's, and at that moment we won't have a valid return address any longer. As a result, our program will suffer a segmentation fault.


And that's it. We're going nowhere fast. This program has just died on our hands. If we were trying to crack this program, we would have wanted, instead, to take control of the return address stored next to EBP. We'd use that value and point towards some other function we wanted, for example, thus altering the program's flow in our favor.

Yes, we're slowly creeping towards true shellcode. We'll get there eventually, don't worry.

But before we do that, we might as well talk about other interesting tidbits that can prove helpful when using a debugger and watching our shellcode or buffer overflow in action.

I've already shown quite a few pics, so I won't give you another one, but here's the very first function that appears in our "Smashing the Stack" doc. It's pretty simple, but it hopefully shines a light on the function we've been analyzing so far:


void function(int a, int b, int c) {

char buffer1[5];

char buffer2[10];

}

void main() {

function(1,2,3);

}


If we look at the memory locations, as we did before with the other program, we'll see:

0xffffd09c: 0x00000000 0xf7ffcff4         0x0000002c 0x00000000
0xffffd0ac: 0xffffdfc0         0xf7fc7550 0x00000000 0xf7da2a4f
0xffffd0bc: 0xffffd0e8 0x565561e5 0x00000001 0x00000002
0xffffd0cc: 0x00000003 0xffffd110         0xf7fc1688 0xf7fc1b60
0xffffd0dc: 0x00000000 0xffffd100 0xf7fa2ff4 0x00000000
0xffffd0ec: 0xf7da92d5 0x00000000 0x00000070 0xf7ffcff4
0xffffd0fc:         0xf7da92d5 0x00000001 0xffffd1b4 0xffffd1bc
0xffffd10c: 0xffffd120 0xf7fa2ff4 0x565561b6 0x00000001

I have put in bold important addresses and their contents. In order, from left to right, going down...

ESP

  • Points to the current top of the stack.
  • At 0xffffd09c (the lowest memory address in this snapshot)
  • ESP is showing the exact spot in memory where new data are pushed onto the stack

Saved EBP

  • At 0xffffd0bc
  • The base pointer of the caller function
  • This marks the base of the previous stack frame before the current function was called

Return Address

  • At 0xffffd0c0
  • This is the address the program will jump back to after the current function completes
  • overwriting this location with a malicious address can cause the program to "return" to an arbitrary memory location

Variables

  • Just below the saved EBP and return address are the local variables and parameters
  • At 0xffffd0c4 (0x00000001), 0xffffd0c8 (0x00000002) and 0xffffd0cc (0x00000003)

Buffer

  • Just below these local variables we can see the space that has been assigned to our buffer1 and buffer2 local variables
  • It's not 5+10 bytes in size. Instead, because of padding and alignment, it will be 8+12 bytes in size, for a total of 20 bytes.
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Next up: We'll learn how to control the return address and force the program to do our bidding. This will set the stage for mastering the art of shellcoding! 

"INTs Aren't Integers and FLOATs aren't Real"

                                     I was told this is a cat-submarine. Tail = Periscope. I believe it.   Over the past few weeks, I’ve be...